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FX market liquidity, funding constraints and capital
flows
Chiara Banti and Kate Phylaktis∗
Abstract
We investigate the determinants of the time variation of the common component of FX
market liquidity across developed and emerging market currencies. We study the impact of
funding liquidity constraints, which proxy for supply considerations, and capital flows, which
proxy for demand considerations of liquidity on transaction costs. Our results show that (i)
funding liquidity constraints measured by the availability of outstanding repos reduce FX market
liquidity, and their impact is stronger when they are associated with an increase in the costs
of funding and a shortening of their maturity; (ii) increasing capital flows at the global level
increase liquidity; (iii) both of these effects were stronger during the recent financial crisis, when
liquidity dry-ups were severe; and (iv) the analysis of individual currencies with diverse riskiness
confirms that a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in market liquidity through
a spiral effect that is stronger for more volatile currencies. Furthermore, we find a similar effect
related to capital flows.
Keywords: foreign exchange; liquidity; funding liquidity constraints; capital flows; mi-
crostructure.
JEL Classification: F31; G15.
1 Introduction
Trading volume in the foreign exchange (FX) market is particularly high compared to other financial
markets. Whether the large trading volume corresponds to a highly liquid FX market depends on
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the definition of liquidity adopted and the proxy employed to measure it. With respect to trading
volume and the bid-ask spread, there are significant differences across currencies and through time.
There is also evidence of a strong systematic component. In fact, in their account of the events
of the 2007/9 financial crisis, Melvin and Taylor (2009) document strong liquidity drops across
currencies. Albeit a systemically important global market, the liquidity of the FX market has begun
to attract the attention of researchers only relatively recently. For instance, measuring liquidity
as the temporary price impact of transactions, recent studies have documented the presence of a
common component in FX market liquidity across currencies (Banti, Phylaktis, and Sarno, 2012;
Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2013). In this paper, we investigate the determinants of the
time-variation in this common component. In particular, we study the impact of funding liquidity
constraints, which proxy for supply considerations, and capital flows, which proxy for demand
considerations of liquidity on transaction costs.
Recently, a literature on the interaction of market liquidity and funding liquidity has emerged
in order to provide an explanation to the severity of the liquidity drop observed during the recent
financial crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Acharya
and Skeie, 2011; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). That is, traders’ financial constraints influence
the liquidity of financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002). It is
important to underline the systematic nature of such an effect: funding liquidity constraints affect
all the operations of traders, creating a systematic source of variation in liquidity across financial
assets. Furthermore, recent studies have proposed an effect of institutional investors’ behavior and
correlated trading as a source of commonality across assets and markets (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka,
2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2012). Moreover, Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) show that
these demand-side factors are more relevant as determinants of liquidity commonality across stocks
than the supply-side factors related to the funding constraints story.
Building on the recent theoretical literature on the interaction of funding liquidity and market
liquidity, we examine whether the time-variation in FX market liquidity is due to changes in the
funding liquidity of the principal traders in FX, namely the financial intermediaries. Indeed, bearing
in mind that the ease with which financial intermediaries are able to finance their operations has
an impact on traders’ operations in the cross-section of the financial assets they trade, we expect
to find a positive relationship between changes in funding constraints and market illiquidity.
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In line with the literature on the role of the demand for liquidity, we extend our analysis to the
investigation of the impact of capital flows between the US and foreign countries on the FX market
illiquidity. Investigating the effect of the pressure on currency markets of cross-border investment
flows, it is important to note that this proxy of liquidity demand comprises different investors. In
fact, international capital flows in stocks and bonds may arise from investments in these assets that
require currency trades as a by-product, or may be the by-product for investments in currencies.
From the perspective of the FX market, these flows include both liquidity traders that enter the
market via dealers and sophisticated informed traders, such as hedge funds and large banks, that are
active on the interdealer market themselves (Osler, 2008; Rime and Schrimpf, 2013). The distinction
is important, the latter provide liquidity to the overall market, whereas the former demand liquidity
on the customer-dealer segment of the FX market. However, the high concentration of FX dealers
allows them to match a large part of trades directly among their customer base, thus reducing the
need to build inventory positions (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2013). As a result,
we expect larger capital flows to improve market liquidity because sophisticated investors are more
active on the interdealer FX market and dealers reduce their spreads due to lower inventory risk
as their customer base trades increase. Furthermore, in our investigation of the determinants of
market liquidity in the FX market we take into account a variable related to market uncertainty,
namely global FX implied volatility (Copeland and Galai, 1983). Our approach is empirical in line
with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001).
Our paper is related to a recent paper by Mancini et al. (2013) which identifies a negative
relationship between the VIX, a proxy for financial uncertainty, and the TED spread, an indicator
of funding liquidity constraints, and FX market liquidity for the most traded currencies during
the recent financial crisis. However, our paper investigates the impact of not only supply but
also demand side factors of FX market illiquidity. Our broad data set of 20 currencies from both
developed and emerging markets over 14 years allows us to explore various aspects of the impact
of funding liquidity constraints and capital flows, a proxy for demand considerations of liquidity.
These include (i) whether funding liquidity dry-ups are worse during the recent financial crisis when
funding became a serious issue as stressed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); (ii) whether when
extending the analysis to individual currencies the impact of funding liquidity constraints is stronger
for illiquid currencies as a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in market liquidity
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through a spiral effect that is stronger for more volatile, less liquid currencies, as again proposed
by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); and (iii) whether capital flows in the FX market affect the
time variation of FX market liquidity as it affects liquidity commonality for the stock market in
Karolyi et al. (2012).
Using a broad data set for 20 daily exchange rates of both developed and emerging markets’ cur-
rencies over 14 years, we employ the daily percentage bid-ask spreads as our measure of individual
currency illiquidity. Averaging across individual currencies, we construct a measure of illiquidity in
the FX market. Thus, our main proxy for FX market illiquidity measures the level of transaction
costs.
In order to proxy for funding liquidity, we consider the conditions on the secured interbank
market in New York and London, which host over 75% of global FX turnover (BIS, 2013). We show
that a lowering in the availability of repurchase agreements for financial intermediaries is associated
with an increase in transaction costs, that is an increase in the illiquidity of the FX market. We
also consider the impact of increasing the cost of funding and shortening of repos maturities on
this relationship. Furthermore, we take into account the conditions of the liquidity demand and
show that as investors buy or sell the currencies vs USD to enter or exit the foreign markets, they
contribute to the liquidity of the currency markets. Overall, our explanatory variables capture an
appreciable fraction of the monthly time series variation in market wide liquidity of around 20%.
The length of our sample period allows us to explore whether liquidity dry-ups were worse
during the recent financial crisis, when funding liquidity became a serious issue and capital flows
experienced a severe drop. We show that both factors of demand and supply of liquidity have a
stronger impact on market illiquidity during the crisis.
Our findings are robust to controlling for global FX volatility. Global FX volatility is found
to increase transactions costs, consistent with previous studies at the individual currency level.
However, while global FX volatility is able to explain a share of the changes in market liquidity,
it does not drive out the effect of our explanatory variables on market liquidity. Even though
our supply and demand side proxies and volatility are intertwined, their effect on market liquidity
can be individually measured. Extending the market level analysis and building on the role of
volatility to determine the commonality in liquidity across currencies, we investigate the impact of
funding liquidity and capital flows in the analysis of individual currencies. In our sample we have
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currencies with diverse riskiness. We take that into account in our panel estimation and confirm
that currencies experience stronger drops in liquidity when higher volatility is associated to shocks
to speculator capital through a spiral effect that is stronger during crisis periods (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2009). Furthermore, we document a stronger illiquidity effect of changes in capital
flows for more volatile currencies, which is larger in magnitude during the crisis.
In summary, our study shows that financial intermediaries have a strong impact on the liquidity
of the FX market, via their supply and demand for liquidity. In fact, market liquidity drops when
their capital availability drops and when their cross-border trading in stocks and bonds reduces.
As expected, the impact is stronger when the market is under distress and funding constraints are
likely to be stronger and flows are likely to sharply drop amid increased uncertainty.
Our results are robust to measuring liquidity at another time of the day when its level is lower,
to the exclusion of the Turkish lira that experienced an extreme behavior during the 2000/1 crisis,
to seasonality, to unexpected changes in liquidity, and to another measure of liquidity that has
recently received significant attention, namely the temporary return reversal inspired by Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003), which relates to the depth of the market.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the methodology for the construction of
our liquidity measures and proposed determinants is presented. Section 3 reports some preliminary
analysis of the data and the results of the regression analysis. Robustness tests are conducted in
section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Estimation of FX market liquidity
No unique definition of liquidity exists. According to Kyle (1985), liquidity is a “slippery and
elusive concept” because of its broadness. In fact, the concept of market liquidity encompasses the
properties of “tightness”, “depth”, and “resiliency”. These attributes describe the characteristics of
transactions and their price impact. In particular, a market is liquid if the cost of quickly turning
around a position is small, the price impact of a transaction is small, and the speed at which
prices recover from a random, uninformative shock is high. In our analysis, we are employing the
percentage bid-ask spreads as a proxy for transaction costs. The bid-ask spread is the most widely
used measure of liquidity in the FX market e.g. Bessembinder (1994), Bollerslev and Melvin (1994),
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Lee (1994), and Hsieh and Kleidon (1996). However, bearing in mind possible limitations of the
bid-ask spread as a measure for liquidity,1 we test the robustness of our analysis to another liquidity
measure, which proxies for the price impact to obtain a more complete picture, a modified version
of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure in section 4.4.2
We build the daily series of percentage bid-ask spreads of the USD against other currencies
following the American system and we employ the percentage spread to increase comparability
across currencies as PSPRi,d = (aski,d− bidi,d)/midi,d, where aski,d, bidi,d and midi,d are the daily
series of the ask, bid and mid prices of the USD against currency i. We obtain the monthly series
by taking the end of the month observations of the daily series. The percentage bid-ask spread
measures transaction costs. Hence, the larger the spread, the larger transaction costs and the lower
the liquidity level. It is important to note that the percentage spread measure is thus a measure of
illiquidity.
In order to build these illiquidity measures, we employ daily data for 20 bid, ask and mid
exchange rates of the USD versus 20 currencies for a time period of 14 years, from January 01,
1999 to December 31, 2012. Of the 20 currencies in the data set, 10 are of developed economies
(Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish krone, euro, Great Britain pound, Japanese yen, New
Zealand dollar, Norwegian kroner, Swedish krona, and Swiss franc) and 10 are of emerging markets
(Brazilian real, Chilean peso, Czech koruna, Hungarian forint, Korean won, Mexican peso, Polish
zloty, Singaporean dollar, South African rand, and Turkish lira).3 The selection of the currencies
reflected the importance of the currencies in FX trading according to BIS (2010) and the availability
of data.4
We obtained the daily series from Datastream (WM/REUTERS), which collects transaction
data from the main interdealer electronic trading platforms. The quotes provided by WM/Reuters
1For example, Grossman and Miller (1988) highlight that the bid-ask spread gives the cost of providing immediacy
of the market maker in the case of a contemporaneous presence of buy and sell trans- actions. Furthermore, because
the spread is valid only for transactions up to a certain size, it provides no information on the prices at which larger
transactions might take place, or how the market might respond to a long sequence of transactions in the same
direction, which could be generated when a trader breaks a large trade into many smaller ones, that could span
several days.
2According to Vayanos and Wang (2013), measures such as those proxying for price impact do not suffer from
those limitations related to the bid-ask spread.
3The classification in developed and emerging countries above does not correspond to the IMF classification, but
follows instead common practice in the FX market.
4The Turkish lira experienced substantial distress during the crisis of 2000/1. For robustness, in section 4.2 we run
the main analysis excluding this currency from the sample to confirm that our results are not driven by its extreme
behavior during those years.
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are collected at 16 GMT, which is the time of highest liquidity in the FX market.5 For a large
sample of the currencies in our data set (AUD, CAD, CHF, CZK, DKK, EUR, GBP, HUF, JPY,
MXN, NOK, NZD, PLN, SGD, SEK, TRY, ZAR)6 the ask and bid rates are from actual trades
and they are calculated independently as the median of actual trades during a fixing period (one
minute). If actual trade rates are not available, quoted rates are reported. For the other currencies
(BRL, CLP, KRW), the bid and ask rates are quotes from Reuters.7
Next, we calculate market illiquidity by averaging across currencies the individual percentage
spread series (e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000a); Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)).
Since we are interested in the changes of market illiquidity and we are not able to reject the
hypothesis that the series is non-stationary, we take the first difference of the logs of the market
illiquidity measure.
Running a regression of individual currency illiquidity on market illiquidity, we find that market
illiquidity can explain a substantial proportion of the movements in individual currency illiquidity.8
Furthermore, in accord with Mancini et al. (2013), we find that more liquid FX rates, such as the
EUR/USD and GBP/USD tend to have lower liquidity sensitivity to market wide FX liquidity.
The opposite is true for less liquid FX rates, such as the BRL/USD, the KRW/USD, TRY/USD
and the HUF/USD.
2.2 Funding liquidity constraints
2.2.1 The repo market
Building on the recent theoretical literature on the interaction of funding and market liquidity, we
examine whether changes in the availability of funding to traders determine the time-variation in
FX market liquidity.
While the unsecured interbank market is generally more volatile, costlier and restricted to higher
5As a robustness, we employ an alternative measures of illiquidity in section 4.1 by taking the observations of the
bid, ask and mid quotes at 21.50 GMT, which is a time of lower liquidity in the FX market but that is relevant as it
corresponds to the closing of the main US stock exchanges. These data is provided by Thomson Reuters.
6The currencies are against the USD and the abbreviation used are the following: AUD: Australian dollar, BRL:
Brazilian real, CAD: Canadian dollar, CHF: Swiss franc, CLP: Chilean peso, CZK: Czech koruna, DKK: Danish
krone, EUR: euro, GBP: Great British pound, HUF: Hungarian forint, JPY: Japanese yen, KRW: Korean won,
MXN: Mexican peso, NOK: Norwegian kroner, NZD: New Zealand dollar, PLN: Polish zloty, SEK: Swedish krona,
SGD: Singapore dollar, TRY: Turkish lira, ZAR: South African rand.
7It should be noted that Phylaktis and Chen (2009) find using various information measures that the matched tick
by tick indicative data bear no qualitative difference from the transaction data and have higher information content.
8Results are reported in Table 1A of the online Appendix on SSRN.
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quality counterparties, short-term secured funding is the preferred source of wholesale financing
for financial institutions (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar, 2011; Gorton and
Metrick, 2012). Financial institutions generally enter repo contracts to finance their purchases
of securities. The most common collateral in the US and UK markets are sovereign securities,
either Treasuries or Gilts, which enjoy relatively low credit risk and high liquidity. Repos are
relevant in the FX market. For example, looking at exchange rates and funding conditions, Adrian,
Etula, and Shin (2010) analyze the exchange rate impact of funding constraints of US financial
intermediaries by considering the amount outstanding of commercial papers and repos and find
that changes in funding liquidity affect exchange rate variation of some currencies against the US
dollar. Moreover, Coffey and Hrung (2009) and Mancini Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) investigate
the impact of funding conditions on deviations from the covered interest parity conditions using
repo rates on MBS collateral.
Thus, we investigate the implications of funding conditions on FX market liquidity by employing
the amount outstanding of repos as a measure of funding availability. We consider the repo markets
in the US and UK because New York and London are the two main financial centers for FX trading.9
The data of the outstanding amount of US repos is collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York on a weekly basis. It comprises the opened positions of primary dealers, serving as trading
counterparties of the New York Fed in its implementation of monetary policy. We construct the
monthly series of the overnight amount outstanding by taking the last observation of the month
available. The data of outstanding amount of UK repos is collected by the Bank of England at
the end of the month and it includes the amount outstanding of all sterling repos of monetary
financial institutions versus the private sector. Since we are interested in the tightening of funding
liquidity and we cannot reject the null of non-stationarity, we take the first difference of the logs of
the amount outstanding of US and UK repos. We expect to find a negative relationship between
changes in funding liquidity and changes in FX market illiquidity. In fact, a decrease in repos
amount outstanding is associated with a decrease in the volume of funding available to traders.
As a result, traders are expected to decrease their operations leading to an increase in FX market
illiquidity.
Funding liquidity constraints may materialize also as an increase in the cost of funding or a
9According to BIS (2013), London and New York together account for 75% of the overall trading volume in FX
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decrease in the maturity of the contracts.10 To account for these considerations, we build proxies
for the cost of funding and the shortening of the maturities in the repo market. We proxy for the
cost of funding in the US repo market with the 3-month US LIBOR-OIS spread that has been
found to be highly correlated with the repo rate with Treasuries as collateral in the US (Gorton
and Metrick, 2012). The data is available from Bloomberg starting in the 2001. For the UK repo
market, we obtain the series of the end of month 3-month Gilt repo rates from the Bank of England.
We take the first difference of the two variables because they exhibit non-stationarity. Finally, we
construct a measure of the maturity structure of repos outstanding. We build the measure only for
the US repo market because the breakdown of repo maturity, overnight vs term, is not available for
the UK. We build a ratio of the overnight amount outstanding over the total amount outstanding
that we interpret as an indicator of the shortening of the maturity of the funding available.
2.2.2 Financial firms stock returns
We include in our analysis another indicator of tightness of capital in the market, which relates
to the quality of institutions. Financial constraints are likely to be binding when the quality of
financial institutions declines. In fact, an increase in counterparty risk may lead suppliers of funds
to ration credit. Moreover, funding conditions may be related to the quality of financial institutions
that provide funds. In fact, less funding may be available due to the inability of funding suppliers
to lend as they experience distress (Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer, 2011). Hence, we include the
stock returns of financial institutions in the US as a proxy for their overall credit quality.
Following Hameed et al. (2010), we obtain daily data on the stock returns of investment banks
and securities brokers and dealers listed in the NYSE from the CRSP database.11 We begin
by calculating excess returns by regressing individual stock returns on the value-weighted NYSE
market return provided by CRSP:
reti,d = αi + βimktd + i,d (1)
We take i as the daily series of returns for each stock i in excess of the market return mkt.
10It is necessary to note that repo rates may be low but funding may be generally rationed and only available to more
creditworthy parties. Also, low rates may accompany stricter collateral requirements and higher haircuts. Similarly,
to reduce risk and lower the cost of borrowing, short maturities are largely preferred as maturity of contracts.
11We include the stocks identified by the SIC code 6211.
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The common component across the stocks is then obtained by taking the cross-sectional weighted-
average of the individual series, where the weights are the market capitalization of the stocks at the
end of the previous year over the total market capitalization of the stocks in the sample. Finally,
we obtain the monthly series by taking the last observation of the series in the month.
We expect the quality of the financial institutions to be negatively related to FX market illiquid-
ity. However, stock returns of financial institutions are affected by several other factors unrelated
to funding conditions. As such, we expect to find the linkage to be stronger when the financial
system is under distress (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2000b; Hameed et al., 2010).
2.3 Aggregated capital flows
In addition to funding considerations, we extend the analysis to the implications of changes in the
demand for liquidity.
Most recently, Karolyi et al. (2012) find that conditions on the demand side affect the common-
ality in liquidity across stocks. They measure demand-side determinants with a series of proxies
derived for the stock markets of a variety of countries. Following their insights and focusing on the
FX market, we investigate whether international capital flows exert pressure on the FX market and
affect its liquidity over time, as investors require liquidity on the currency markets to enter/exit
foreign stock and bond markets.
We measure capital flows as the aggregated flow of international capital between the US and
foreign countries. The monthly data on bilateral flows is from the U.S. Department of Treasury. We
take the inflows and outflows of equity and bond investments between the US and the 20 countries
whose currencies are included in our sample. We aggregate the capital flows across countries and
we measure the investment pressure on the FX market as the sum of absolute inflows and outflows.
Indeed, we are interested in the demand of the currency pair. So, irrespective of whether investors
purchase or sell the foreign currency for the US dollar, their demand of the currency pair is still
positive. Hence, we build the common measure across currencies as follows:
flowsi,t = equity
in
i,t + equity
out
i,t + bond
in
i,t + bond
out
i,t , (2)
flowt =
20∑
i=1
flowsi,t for t = 1, .., T
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where equity and bond are the equity and bond investment series between the US and country
i, and the superscripts in and out indicate inflows and outflows in absolute values. Finally, we
log-difference the series because it exhibits non-stationarity in levels.
We explore the impact of capital flows on FX market liquidity by drawing from the microstruc-
ture literature of the FX market. In fact, we identify which segment of the market capital flows are
more likely to affect and investigate the final impact on the interdealer segment, which is the one
whose liquidity we are studying. We note that this proxy of liquidity demand comprises different
investors. In fact, international capital flows in stocks and bonds may arise from investments in
these assets that require currency trades as a by-product, or may be the by-product for investments
in currencies. From the perspective of the FX market, these flows include both liquidity traders
that enter the market via dealers and sophisticated informed traders, such as hedge funds and large
banks, which are active on the interdealer market themselves (Osler, 2008; Rime and Schrimpf,
2013). While the latter provide liquidity to the overall market, the former investors largely dis-
regard the currency component of their strategies and rely on custodian banks or dealers for FX
trades (Osler, 2008; Rime and Schrimpf, 2013). With respect to the FX market, these investors
are thus uninformed liquidity traders that demand liquidity at the customer-dealer level. Since
the high concentration of FX dealers allows them to match a large part of trades directly among
their customer base, larger customer orders (associated with larger capital flows) reduce the need
to build inventory positions (Menkhoff et al., 2013). As a result, we expect larger capital flows
to improve market liquidity because sophisticated investors are more active on the interdealer FX
market and because dealers reduce their spreads due to lower inventory risk as their customer base
trades increase.
2.4 Global FX volatility
We include global FX volatility in our analysis to control for the level of uncertainty in the FX
market (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2012). Following the inventory control theo-
retical models, an increase in the volatility affects the riskiness associated with holding inventory
in the currencies involved. The increase in the uncertainty will thus result in a decrease in liq-
uidity. While this relationship is found for individual currency liquidity (Bollerslev and Melvin,
1994; Bessembinder, 1994; Ding, 1999), it should also be in place once market-wide liquidity is
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considered. An observed increase in FX market volatility will impact the riskiness of holding any
inventories in FX, thus leading to a decrease in the liquidity of the FX market as a whole.
We employ the JP Morgan VXY volatility index that captures the implied volatility from
currency options of G7 countries and we take the last observation in the month to build our
monthly series. Since the series exhibits non stationarity, we take the first difference of the logs of
the measure.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Description of the data
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in levels (panel A) and differences (panel B).
The average percentage bid-ask spread in the FX market in our period is 0.09% with a relatively
small standard deviation of 0.03%. In contrast, the proxy of changes in FX market illiquidity
exhibits a strong variability, with a relatively high standard deviation over the mean. Turning to
the amount outstanding of repos, the US market is the largest, with an average monthly amount
of over USD 1.5 trillion as opposed to GBP 65 billions in the UK repo market. Moreover, the
aggregated flows have averaged USD 3 trillions during our sample period with some degree of
variation, reaching the peak of over USD 8 trillion in August 2007. Overall, all our measures, except
financial firms’ excess returns, present a high serial correlation. Generally, the serial correlation
are lower for the differenced variables. Furthermore, the differenced variables have a significantly
higher variability as opposed to the levels.
Figure 1 presents the level and change of FX market illiquidity. The series exhibit strong
variation through time. Indeed, both the level and changes in transaction costs exhibit a high
variation during the first part of the sample period. In particular, there are spikes in illiquidity
during 2000, when Turkish lira were hit by a severe financial crisis.12 The impact of the Turkish
lira distress on the analysis is evaluated in section 4.2, where the Turkish lira is excluded by the
sample of currencies and the results of the main analysis are confirmed.
The graphical analysis of the main supply-side explanatory variable presents common patterns of
sharp increases in funding constraints during the recent financial crisis (Figure 2). As an exception,
12Figure 1C in the online Appendix on SSRN shows the pattern of the common component in liquidity across
currencies when the TRY is removed from the sample.
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the level of UK repo amount outstanding were rather unaffected by the financial crisis and their drop
is registered later, with the start of the European sovereign debt crisis. In Figure 3, aggregated
capital flows share a common pattern with the US repo amount outstanding, as they increased
steadily during the sample period to drop sharply during the crisis. They however quickly recovered
and started rising again.13
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. While the correlation coefficients between the
levels need to be interpreted with caution due to the presence of a time trend in the variables, it
is possible to note some relationships. There is a strong negative correlation between FX market
illiquidity and the amount outstanding of repos, at around -50%. Moreover, the two measures
of repos are highly correlated, with a coefficient of 56%. Turning the attention to the rates,
UK repo rates are positively correlated with FX market illiquidity, with a coefficient of 51%. In
contrast, the proxy for US repo rates has a relatively low and negative correlation with illiquidity.
There is no evidence of correlation between the two proxies for repo rates. The last variable for
funding conditions is positively correlated with FX market illiquidity, even if the coefficient is
smaller at 14%. The demand-side variable, aggregated flows, has a strong negative correlation with
FX market illiquidity, at around -56%. Overall, the coefficients decline when the changes in the
variables are considered, suggesting that indeed the time trend is an important component of the
large coefficients between the levels of the variables. Nonetheless, the direction of the relationship
is largely unchanged. We account for this in the analysis and focus on the differenced variables.
3.2 Regression analysis
3.2.1 Market illiquidity, funding constraints and capital flows
We conduct a regression analysis to test whether movements in the proposed variables explain a
sizable share of variation in FX market illiquidity.14
Hence, we run the following regression of the changes in market illiquidity on the proposed
13The graphs of repo rates, financial firms excess returns and global FX volatility are presented in Figures 2C-4C
in the online Appendix on SSRN.
14In an attempt to investigate the dynamics between market illiquidity and its determinants, we estimated a VAR
with the main variables. The results provide little evidence of dynamics, with weak causality from UK repos to
market illiquidity and no significant reactions in the IRFs.
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determinants:
∆illiqt =α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt, (3)
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repos amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and
∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the financial firms’ excess
returns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between the US and foreign countries. We include
the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control variable for market uncertainty. Finally, one lag
of the dependent variable accounts for the serial correlation in the residuals.
Table 3 reports the results. Looking at funding liquidity constraints, changes in the amount
outstanding of repos in both markets are significant in explaining changes in the transaction costs.
In detail, the negative coefficients tell us that tightening funding liquidity constraints result in an
increase in transaction costs. Proxies of repo rates are not significant, confirming their inferior
ability to capture the conditions of funding markets in comparison to volume-related measures.
Financial firms’ excess returns are also insignificant in this analysis. Turning to the demand-side
factor, given the negative coefficient, increases in capital flows are associated with improvements
in FX market liquidity. The key to interpret the results lies in the structure of the FX market.
In fact, larger capital flows may be associated with lower inventory risk for dealers given the
higher trading activity of their customer base and the consequent larger risk-sharing among them,
and with more active trading on the interdealer market. Both these factors contribute to reduce
spreads.15 Finally, global FX volatility is significant in explaining the movements in FX market
illiquidity, consistent with previous studies at the individual currency level (Bollerslev and Melvin,
1994; Bessembinder, 1994; Ding, 1999). The coefficient is positive as expected, since an increase in
uncertainty is associated with an increase in transaction costs.
The regressions have a relatively high explanatory power, with adjusted R-squared around 20%.
As expected given the negative serial correlation of our illiquidity measure, the lagged dependent
15Capital flows may thus be related not only to liquidity demand, but also to its supply. Nonetheless they carry
different information than funding liquidity. Estimating regression (3) with the funding variables together with capital
flow, both set of variables stay significant and correctly signed. Results are not reported for brevity but are available
upon request by the authors.
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variable is statistically significant.16
The impact of funding constraints and capital flows on illiquidity is not only statistically signif-
icant, but also economically meaningful. Estimating the impact of one standard deviation change
in the independent variables on the percentage change of the spread measure, we find that spreads
drop by 0.27 and 0.34 basis points with a standard deviation increase in US and UK repos re-
spectively. The same change in both repos is associated with a reduction of 0.60 basis points in
spreads during the crisis (see section 3.2.3). A standard deviation increase in capital flows reduces
the spreads by 0.23 basis points overall, and by 0.60 during the crisis. These values are relevant for
a rather tight market, where the average percentage spread is 9 basis points (Table 1).
To summarize, we find that FX market illiquidity is affected by both conditions of the supply
and demand. Indeed, as funding liquidity increase, FX market liquidity improves. Moreover, we
find evidence that international investment flows do not subtract liquidity in the currency markets,
but rather contribute to make those markets.
3.2.2 The effect of funding cost and maturity
Funding constraints are not only binding when funds available decline, but also when their cost
increases and their maturity shortens. Having documented a significant impact of changes in
funding aggregates on FX market illiquidity, in this section we consider the implications of funding
costs and shortening of the maturity on this liquidity effect.
While repo rates do not affect FX market illiquidity directly, they may have an impact when
the costs are associated with changes in volume. To capture these indirect effects, we interact our
proxies of amount outstanding of repos with dummies for decreases and increases in the repo rates.
Moreover, we investigate the maturity effect and we interact the amount outstanding in repos with
dummies for shortening and lengthening of the maturities of repos.17
In more detail, we run the following regression:
∆illiqt =α+ β
US,+(dummy+ ∗ ∆reposUSt ) + βUS,−(dummy− ∗ ∆reposUSt ) (4)
16We test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable. We find that its inclusion
improves the estimation but does not affect the significance of the explanatory variables of interest. Results are not
reported for brevity but are available upon request by the authors.
17As noted in section 2.2.1, we restrict the analysis of the maturity effect to the US repo market due to limitations
in availability of UK data.
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+ βUK,+(dummy+ ∗ ∆reposUKt ) + βUK,−(dummy− ∗ ∆reposUKt ) + σvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt,
where dummy+ and dummy− are dummies for increases and decreases in repo rates (dummy+rates
and dummy−rates) or maturities (dummy
+
mat and dummy
−
mat).
Table 4 reports the results. For the UK repo market, the cost effect is significant. In fact, the
interaction term of increases in repo rates with the amount outstanding of repos is negative and
statistically significant. Hence, in the UK repo markets the liquidity effect of tightening funding
conditions is also related to increases in the cost of funding. The same effect is not found in the US
repo market.18 However, the interaction of funding conditions with the maturity of repo contracts
shows that maturity plays a role in the impact of funding constraints on FX market illiquidity. In
particular, the liquidity effect is stronger when the change in the amount outstanding of repos is
associated with a shortening of their maturity.
To summarize, this section documents a significant interaction of the impact of funding on FX
market illiquidity with the cost and maturity of the funding available. Hence, we can conclude
that changes to the volume of funding available have a stronger impact on liquidity when they are
associated with an increase in the cost and a decline in the maturity of the funding available.
3.2.3 The recent financial crisis
Given that market declines are indicative of funding liquidity constraints, we explore whether
funding liquidity dry-ups are worse during the recent financial crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009).19 Furthermore, capital flows declined sharply during the crisis, reducing the demand for
liquidity in the currency markets.
We use a dummy, which takes the value of 1 during the period from Lehman Brothers collapse
on September 2008 to July 2009, when the US recession ended, and 0 otherwise. We interact this
indicator of the recent crisis with our measures of changes in funding conditions and aggregated
flows. We control for the non-crisis period with an interactive term of the variables with a dummy
that takes the value of 0 for the crisis episode, and 1 otherwise. In detail, we run the following
18The lack of significance for the US repo market may depend on the less precise US measure that is a proxy for
repo rates, while the UK measure is the actual repo rates for gilts.
19Our data set enables us to study several important crisis episodes. However, we restrict the analysis to the latest
crisis when funding liquidity became a real constraint for financial intermediaries.
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regression:
∆illiqt =α+ β(dummy
crisis
t ∗ ∆Xt) + γ(dummynocrisist ∗ ∆Xt) + δvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt (5)
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and
∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the financial firms’ excess
returns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US, and vol is
the global FX implied volatility. Finally, one lag of the dependent variable accounts for the serial
correlation in the residuals.
Table 5 shows the results of the analysis and present a rather clear effect. As expected, during
the crisis the effects of funding constraints and aggregated flows are stronger. In fact, the coefficients
associated with the crisis dummy are generally double the non-crisis ones.
3.2.4 The impact of funding liquidity and capital flows across currencies
To complete the analysis of the impact of demand and supply factors on illiquidity, we turn our
attention to the level of the individual currencies. In this section, we investigate whether curren-
cies which exhibit higher volatility also present the largest impact of changes in funding liquidity
constraints on illiquidity, in accord with proposition 6(iv) of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Furthermore, as previously we extend the investigation to the demand-side of liquidity and analyze
the interaction between the liquidity impact of aggregated capital flows and volatility.
We employ measures of changes in illiquidity of individual currencies, by taking the first differ-
ence of the logs of all series and build a matrix of changes in monthly transaction cost over time
for each currency. Next, we include the measures in a panel regression with fixed effects and we
estimate the impact on the changes in individual currency illiquidity, ∆illiqi,t, of changes in the
explanatory variables interacted with individual currency volatility:20
∆illiqi,t =α+ β(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t) + ζ∆Xt + δVi,t + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt (6)
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt] and Vi are the series
20We measure the volatility for each currency as the monthly standard deviation of daily currency returns.
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of each currency realized volatility. ∆reposUS and ∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount
outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US
and UK, excret are the financial firms’ excess returns, and ∆flow are the aggregated capital flow
between foreign countries and the US. Finally, we include in the regression one lag of the dependent
variable to account for the serial correlation in the residuals.
Table 6 presents the results of the regression. Confirmation of the relationship between currency
illiquidity and volatility is reported in model (1), as more volatile currencies are associated with
higher illiquidity. Furthermore, we confirm our main finding that an increase in funding reduces
currency illiquidity. Moreover, we show that volatility interacts significantly with UK funding
conditions, which implies that an increase in funding constraints will increase illiquidity more for
more volatile currencies. This volatility effect is present also with respect to the demand-side factor.
In fact, more volatile currencies are more strongly affected by changes in capital flows.21
Finally, we investigate whether the volatility effect is related to the crisis episode. Using the
crisis and no-crisis dummies described above in equation (5), we interact them with our explanatory
variables in this context, as follows:
∆illiqi,t =α+ β(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummycrisist ) + γ(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummynocrisist ) + (7)
+ ζ∆Xt + δVi,t + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt.
Table 7 confirms the presence of an asymmetric effect of volatility depending on the conditions of
the market. As expected from the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we
find repos in the UK to have a significant marginal impact on more volatile currencies during the
crisis, when funding constraints were generally tighter. Moreover, we also find a marginal effect of
capital flows on more volatile currencies during the crisis. This confirms the evidence found in our
main analysis in relation to the crisis.
In summary, we find that demand and supply factors’ impact on market illiquidity is related to
the volatility of the currencies. Indeed, funding liquidity conditions are mostly relevant for volatile
currencies during the crisis. Also, aggregated flows are more strongly associated with volatile
currencies in crisis times.
21We do not have a prior with respect to this effect.
18
4 Robustness tests
4.1 FX market liquidity at New York markets close
In this section, we conduct the main analysis with an alternative measure of liquidity estimated
at a different time during the day, when the FX market liquidity is generally lower. This time
corresponds to the close of New York stock exchanges. In more detail, we take the bid, ask and mid
prices collected at 21.50 GMT, or 16.50 EST, by Thomson Reuters and available from Datastream.
We employ the data to build a new measure of FX market illiquidity following the procedure
described in section (2.1). We then run the main regression analysis (3) with this new measure.
The results confirm the main findings.22 Tightening funding liquidity constraints in the US and
UK repo markets have strong positive effects on FX market illiquidity. In addition, the illiquidity
effect of aggregated flows is still significant. Interestingly, the coefficients associated with the
explanatory variables are higher than in the main analysis, as it is the explanatory power of the
regressions. Hence, the liquidity demand and supply factors are stronger when the level of liquidity
in the FX market is scarce.
4.2 Filtering the FX market liquidity measure
The graphical analysis in Figure 1 shows a sharp rise in the level and variation of market illiquidity
during the Turkish crisis in 2000-2001. To exclude that our main results are driven by the extreme
behavior of the Turkish lira, we remove the TRY from the sample of the currencies and estimate
the common component in illiquidity across the remaining 19 currencies.23 Next, we estimate the
main regression analysis (3) with this new measure. The results confirm the robustness of the main
analysis to the behavior of the Turkish lira.24
Moreover, we evaluate whether the results of the main analysis are robust to the filtering for
seasonality of our illiquidity variable. This is to account for the effects documented in Bessembinder
(1994) and Ding (1999) of increases in FX spreads before weekends. We filter the daily measures
22Results are available in Table 1B in the online Appendix on SSRN.
23The systemic effect of the crisis on the illiquidity of other currencies is still present, even after excluding the TRY.
The figure of the illiquidity measure calculated excluding the TRY is shown in Figure 1C in the online Appendix on
SSRN.
24Results are available in Table 2B in the online Appendix on SSRN.
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of transaction costs for each currency for the day-of-the-week effect.25 We run the main regression
analysis (3) with this new measure. The results confirm the robustness of the main results to
seasonality.26
4.3 Unexpected changes in FX market illiquidity
In the analysis of the determinants of the time-variation in FX market illiquidity, we looked at
changes in common illiquidity. As a robustness check, we now investigate whether unexpected
changes, or shocks, to FX market illiquidity have the same determinants identified so far.
In order to identify the unexpected component of changes in FX market illiquidity, we take
the residuals of an AR(1) model of the common illiquidity measure as our proxy.27 Next, we run
the main regression analysis (3) (excluding the lagged dependent variable) with this measure of
shocks in FX market as the dependent variable. The results confirm the determinants found to be
significant in explaining changes in FX market illiquidity.28
4.4 FX market depth
In our main analysis above we analyzed changes in transaction costs as a measure of changes in
the illiquidity of the FX market. Here, we extend our analysis to a different proxy. We employ the
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure and estimate liquidity as the expected temporary return
reversal accompanying order flow. The Pastor-Stambaugh measure of liquidity captures the return
reversal due to the behavior of risk-averse market makers, thus identifying market depth. Indeed,
a market is deep if large trades are executed without a substantial price impact. We employ the
measure of FX market liquidity developed in Banti et al. (2012). This measure is available from
January 1999 to July 2008.29
25The filtering is done by estimating:
PSPRi,d = α+ βDummyd + εd
where PSPR are the daily spreads and Dummy = [dummyMon, dummyTue, dummyWed, dummyThu]. The dummies
take the value of 1 for the days of the week, and 0 otherwise, and the Friday effect is captured by the constant. The
residuals are the filtered illiquidity measures. We take the last observation of each month from the daily series. The
market measure is obtained as the cross-sectional equally-weighted average.
26Results are available in Table 2B in the online Appendix on SSRN.
27We take an AR(1) model because it allows us to eliminate serial correlation from the residuals.
28Results are available in Table 3B in the online Appendix on SSRN.
29The FX transaction data is obtained from State Street Corporation, one of the major custodian institutions.
The data represent daily order flow for the 20 currencies, defined as the overall buying pressure on the currency in
millions of transactions. The transaction data provided is the net flow filtered through a ‘normalization’ to increase
comparability and ensure confidentiality (Banti et al., 2012).
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We run the main regression analysis (3) with this alternative liquidity measure. We find the
availability of funding liquidity to traders to be still an important determinant of FX market
liquidity. In more detail, only the variable for the US repo market is significant and this is reasonable
since this measure of market liquidity captures the trading activity of financial institutions based
in the US. However, the demand factor is not significant in this context.30
5 Conclusions
The recent financial crisis has drawn attention to the liquidity of financial markets. In this paper,
we investigate the determinants of the time variation of the common component of liquidity in the
FX market. Our broad data set of 20 currencies from both developed and emerging markets over 14
years allows us to explore various aspects of the impact of both supply and demand determinants
of FX market liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread. We study the impact of funding liquidity
constraints which proxy for supply considerations of liquidity, drawing from the recent literature
on the interaction of market liquidity and funding liquidity, which has emerged in order to provide
an explanation to the severity of the liquidity drop observed during the recent financial crisis
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed et al., 2010; Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Acharya and
Viswanathan, 2011). Our results confirm the prediction of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that
funding liquidity is a driving state variable of commonality in liquidity, as well as of individual
currencies.
We proxy demand considerations by international capital flows between the US and the foreign
countries inspired by studies, which highlight the importance of institutional investors behaviour as
a source of commonality in liquidity across stocks (Karolyi et al., 2012). Extending that analysis to
the FX market, we identify liquidity demand on the FX market by the buying and selling pressure
triggered by capital flows between the US and a set of countries. We find changes in these flows
to determine the time-variation in FX market illiquidity. Interestingly, these flows do not seem to
use liquidity, but rather to have an aggregate effect, which reduces the bid-ask spreads.
Our empirical investigation also documents a strong relationship between market illiquidity and
FX market uncertainty, measured as the implied volatility in currency options. In addition to the
market level effect, currency volatility affects the illiquidity impact of funding and capital flows.
30Results are available in Table 4B in the online Appendix on SSRN.
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Our explanatory variables capture an appreciable fraction of the monthly time series variation
in market wide liquidity, of around 20%. The results are robust to controlling for measurement
of liquidity at another time of the day, filtering for seasonality and the extreme behaviour of
the Turkish lira during the 2000/1 crisis. Also, the explanatory variables are determinants of the
unexpected changes in FX market illiquidity as well. Our results with respect to funding constraints
are robust to an alternative liquidity measure, such as the Pastor-Stambaugh.
In conclusion, our study shows that financial intermediaries have a strong impact on the liquidity
of the FX market, via their supply and demand for liquidity. Indeed, declines in capital availability
and capital flows lead to lower FX market liquidity, especially during crisis episodes.
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Appendix A. Regression of currencies’ illiquidity on market illiquidity
Table 1A: Regression of currencies’ illiquidity on market illiquidity
AUD BRL CAD CHF CLP CZK DKK EUR GBP HUF
Constant -0.0050 -0.0167 -0.0025 -0.0005 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0073 0.0079
-0.1685 -0.4311 -0.0748 -0.0229 0.1529 0.0547 0.0016 -0.1161 -0.2326 0.3266
∆illiqt -0.1070 0.6363 0.0920 0.3751 0.6309 0.3820 0.2795 0.2753 0.0933 0.7943
-0.6377 2.8801 0.4893 3.1784 3.5065 2.6392 1.8413 1.7965 0.5198 5.7590
Rbar -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.16
JPY KRW MXN NOK NZD PLN SEK SGD TRY ZAR
Constant -0.0053 -0.0073 -0.0137 -0.0010 -0.0029 0.0044 -0.0048 -0.0018 0.0057 0.0002
-0.1925 -0.0882 -0.3217 -0.0354 -0.0900 0.1648 -0.2291 -0.0614 0.1500 0.0059
∆illiqt 0.2132 1.2333 0.9239 0.5632 0.6061 0.5891 0.2805 0.3037 2.0278 0.7581
1.3555 2.6211 3.7912 3.4346 3.3464 3.9076 2.3518 1.8168 9.36.84 4.1489
Rbar 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.09
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of changes in each individual currencies’
illiquidity on changes in common market illiquidity:
∆illiqi,t = αi + βi∆illiqt + εi,t.
The coefficients are reported in bold when the variable is statistically significant at 5%. t-statistics
are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coefficients. The sample period is
from January 1999 to December 2012. The currencies are against the USD and the abbreviation
used are the following: AUD: Australian dollar, BRL: Brazilian real, CAD: Canadian dollar, CHF:
Swiss franc, CLP: Chilean peso, CZK: Czech koruna, DKK: Danish krone, EUR: euro, GBP: Great
British pound, HUF: Hungarian forint, JPY: Japanese yen, KRW: Korean won, MXN: Mexican
peso, NOK: Norwegian kroner, NZD: New Zealand dollar, PLN: Polish zloty, SEK: Swedish krona,
SGD: Singapore dollar, TRY: Turkish lira, ZAR: South African rand.
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Appendix B. Robustness tests
Table 1B: Determinants of FX market illiquidity, at a less liquid time
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆reposUS -1.0886
-2.8522
∆reposUK -0.5819
-3.1188
∆ratesUS -0.1064
-1.5973
∆ratesUK -0.1263
-1.3119
excret 0.0682
0.3176
∆flow -0.3546
-2.5647
vol 0.6749 0.6771 0.7831 0.6461 0.6842 0.7421
2.9684 3.0937 3.3262 2.8204 3.0699 3.3965
∆illiqt−1 -0.4044 -0.4168 -0.5079 -0.4335 -0.4269 -0.4242
-4.7329 -5.0295 -6.5651 -5.1332 -4.9805 -5.0161
constant 0.0059 0.0049 -0.0009 -0.0046 -0.0007 0.0019
0.2891 0.2480 -0.0476 -0.2341 -0.0361 -0.0919
Rbar 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.23
LMtest 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (3) estimated via
OLS with an alternative dependent variable, constructed with data observed at the 21.50 GMT:
∆illiqNY timet = α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + ϕ∆illiq
NY time
t−1 + εt,
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and
∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are financial firms’ excess re-
turns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US. We include
the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control variable for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics
are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test
p-values for the null of first-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two
rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS for
which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 2B: Determinants of FX market illiquidity, filtering for seasonality and excluding the Turkish
lira
a. Excluding the TRY
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆reposUS -0.3919
-2.2967
∆reposUK -0.3563
-3.4300
∆ratesUS -0.0498
-1.4698
∆ratesUK -0.0453
-1.1427
excret 0.0065
0.0666
∆flow -0.1848
-2.8152
vol 0.3253 0.3256 0.3531 0.3118 0.3242 0.3594
2.8420 2.5515 2.8338 2.8820 2.8410 3.7150
∆illiqt−1 -0.4441 -0.4513 -0.4661 -0.4815 -0.4732 -0.4536
-6.3673 -6.4968 -5.7108 -6.8549 -6.8138 -6.8653
constant -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0061 -0.0099 -0.0084 -0.0069
-0.6188 -0.5133 -0.6098 -0.9882 -0.8592 -0.7303
Rbar 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28
LMtest 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.04
b. Filtering for seasonality
∆reposUS -0.0003
-2.1747
∆reposUK -0.0003
-3.5189
∆ratesUS 0.0000
-1.7682
∆ratesUK 0.0000
-0.7015
excret 0.0000
-0.3199
∆flow -0.0001
-2.2842
vol 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
2.7099 2.5055 2.9009 2.7411 2.7076 2.9729
∆illiqt−1 -0.4487 -0.4465 -0.4808 -0.4812 -0.4776 -0.4587
-6.3273 -6.2657 -5.6843 -6.7410 -6.8258 -6.8590
constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.6586 -0.5134 -0.5531 -0.9607 -0.8872 -0.7732
Rbar 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.28
LMtest 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.06
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (3) estimated via
OLS with two alternative dependent variables, excluding the TRY from the sample of currencies
in panel A and filtering the transaction cost measures for seasonality in panel B:
∆illiqt = α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt,
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and
∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are financial firms’ excess re-
turns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US. We include
the global FX implied volatility, vol, to account for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are
adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test
p-values for the null of first-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two
rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS for
which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 3B: Determinants of shocks to FX market illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆reposUS -0.4562
-2.6147
∆reposUK -0.3245
-2.8283
∆ratesUS -0.0.0553
-1.6474
∆ratesUK 0.0002
0.0045
excret 0.0018
0.0180
∆flow -0.1849
-2.4504
vol 0.2906 0.2917 0.2806 0.2918 0.2919 0.3258
2.2684 2.3022 2.2522 2.3616 2.3066 2.6970
constant -0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0089 -0.0080 -0.0080 -0.0066
-0.4392 0.4163 -0.8870 -0.6798 -0.6654 -0.6798
Rbar 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
LMtest 0.75 0.92 0.09 0.50 0.50 0.43
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (3) (excluding the
lagged dependent variable) estimated via OLS with the shocks in FX market illiquidity as the
dependent variable:
∆illiqUNEXPt = α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + εt,
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt] and ∆illiq
UNEXP are
the residuals from the regression of FX market illiquidity on its lag. ∆reposUS and ∆reposUK are
the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the
differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are financial firms’ excess returns, ∆flow are the
aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied
volatility, vol, to account for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West
(1987) and reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of first-
order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is
from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS for which the sample period starts
in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 4B: Determinants of FX market liquidity, measured as market depth
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆reposUS 0.0043
2.0893
∆reposUK 0.0000
-0.0206
∆ratesUS 0.0004
0.6381
∆ratesUK 0.0011
0.6893
excret -0.0021
-0.9526
∆flow -0.0009
-0.5028
vol -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0039 0-0.0045 -0.0037
-1.6190 -1.3776 -1.3936 -1.3638 -1.5268 -1.2397
∆illiqt−1 -0.5177 -0.4874 -0.4585 -0.4978 -0.4952 -0.4844
-7.8736 -7.3925 -5.3605 -7.1860 -7.5886 -7.6807
constant -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.3009 -0.1588 -0.4265 -0.1520 -0.1188 -0.0966
Rbar 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24
LMtest 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.06
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (3) estimated via
OLS with the Pastor-Stambaugh measure as the dependent variable:
∆liqt = α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + ϕ∆liqt−1 + εt,
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt] and ∆liq is the
Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure. ∆reposUS and ∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount
outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US
and UK, excret are financial firms’ excess returns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between
foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, to account for un-
certainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the
coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of first-order serial correlation in the
residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to July 2008,
except for the ∆ratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
27
Appendix C. Additional graphs
Figure 1C: FX market illiquidity excluding the TRY The FX market illiquidity is calculated
as the cross-sectional average of percentage bid-ask spreads across the 19 currencies in the sample
against the USD. The shaded area indicates the recent financial crisis from September 2008 to June
2009.
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(a) US
(b) UK
Figure 2C: Repo rates in the US and UK. Repo rates in the US are proxied by the 3-month
LIBOR-OIS spread, starting from 2001, and it is in percentage points. Repo rates in the UK are
the 3-month Gilt repo rates, and are expressed in percentage points. The shaded area indicates the
recent financial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 3C: Financial firms’ excess returns The graph shows the common component in financial
firms’ excess returns in the US. Excess returns are obtained as the residuals from a one factor model
and they are the value-weighted average across firms. The shaded area indicates the recent financial
crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 4C: Global FX volatility The graph shows the global FX volatility implied in currency
options. The shaded area indicates the recent financial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Levels
FX illiq US repos UK repos US rates UK rates flow vol excret
mean 0.0009 1,579,444 65,090 28.7114 3.5111 3,913,828 10.6655 0.0000
median 0.0008 1,706,992 53153 14.1000 4.4200 3,641,565 10.3150 0.0079
st dev 0.0003 585,774 44,043 37.7056 2.0227 1,726,367 2.5500 0.0890
min 0.0004 572,920 16,898 3.7100 0.4150 1,435,517 5.9500 -0.7126
max 0.0029 2,861,966 166,957 238.730 6.0350 8,395,932 23.0300 0.1499
skew 2.1914 0.0351 0.6976 3.4058 -0.6131 0.4145 1.5867 -4.3993
kurt 8.9237 -0.7765 -0.8766 14.1017 -1.2766 -0.8345 5.0053 30.6176
AC(1) 0.8099 0.9845 0.9814 0.8744 0.9948 0.9210 0.8899 0.0961
Panel B. Differences
FX illiq US repos UK repos US rates UK rates flow vol
mean -0.0057 0.0061 0.0097 0.0008 -0.0300 0.0069 -0.0022
median -0.0089 0.0083 0.0210 -0.0248 0.0000 0.0225 -0.0116
st dev 0.1752 0.0631 0.1154 0.3408 0.2055 0.1398 0.0948
min -0.5554 -0.2100 -0.3507 -0.8761 -1.7750 -0.4638 -0.2099
max 0.9957 0.1870 0.3205 1.8187 0.3900 0.34468 0.4640
skew 0.9129 -0.0950 -0.2547 1.6873 -4.8839 -0.2156 1.1324
kurt 6.8187 0.7837 0.6519 7.0092 36.4545 0.3038 3.7649
AC(1) -0.3939 -0.1645 0.3157 -0.0304 0.6352 -0.3954 -0.0493
Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported for the illiquidity measure and the explanatory vari-
ables. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the FX market illiquidity, US repo amount
outstanding (in millions of USD), UK repo amount outstanding (in millions of GBP), US 3-month
LIBOR-OIS spread (in differences of percentage points), UK 3-month Gilt repo rates (in percent-
age points), aggregated capital flows between the US and relevant countries (in millions of USD),
global FX implied volatility (in percentage points) and value-weighted average excess returns of
US financial firms. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for the differences of the variables: the
log-differenced FX market illiquidity, log-differenced US repo amount outstanding, log-differenced
UK repo amount outstanding, log-differenced US LIBOR-OIS spread, differenced UK repo rate,
log-differenced aggregated flows and log-differenced global FX implied volatility. AC(1) refers to
the first order autocorrelation of the series.
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Table 2: Correlation matrix
Panel A. Levels
US repos UK repos US rates UK rates flow vol excret
FX illiq -0.46 -0.58 -0.09 0.51 -0.56 -0.03 0.14
US repos 1 0.56 0.45 -0.19 0.86 -0.09 -0.19
UK repos 1 0.35 -0.80 0.67 0.44 -0.14
US rates 1 -0.02 0.36 0.64 -0.11
UK rates 1 -0.39 -0.37 0.07
flow 1 -0.01 -0.24
vol 1 -0.05
Panel B. Differences
US repos UK repos US rates UK rates flow vol excret
(level)
FX illiq -0.23 -0.24 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.18 -0.01
US repos 1 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.05
UK repos 1 -0.12 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.02
US rates 1 0.06 0.07 0.26 0.03
UK rates 1 0.23 -0.11 0.03
flow 1 0.12 0.04
vol 1 -0.12
Notes: The correlation matrix reports the correlation coefficients between the variables. Panel A
shows the correlation coefficients among FX market illiquidity, US repo amount outstanding, UK
repo amount outstanding, US 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread, UK 3-month Gilt repo rates, aggregated
capital flows between the US and relevant countries, global FX implied volatility and value-weighted
average excess returns of US financial firms. Panel B shows the correlation coefficients among the
differences of the variables: log-differenced FX market illiquidity, log-differenced US repo amount
outstanding, log-differenced UK repo amount outstanding, log-differenced US LIBOR-OIS spread,
differenced UK repo rate, log-differenced aggregated flows, log-differenced global FX implied volatil-
ity. Value-weighted average excess returns of US financial firms are in levels.
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Table 3: Determinants of FX market illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆reposUS -0.4719
-2.4796
∆reposUK -0.3277
-2.7986
∆ratesUS -0.0529
-1.5801
∆ratesUK 0.0009
0.0198
excret 0.0022
0.0228
∆flow -0.1852
-2.4790
vol 0.2952 0.2951 0.2710 0.2932 0.2932 0.3275
2.2354 2.2598 2.2049 2.2994 2.2511 2.6359
∆illiqt−1 -0.3586 -0.3683 -0.4416 -0.3855 -0.3855 -0.3824
-3.4365 -3.5369 -6.3563 -3.5596 -3.5767 -3.5384
constant -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0093 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0065
-0.4124 -0.4004 -0.9071 0.6670 -0.6566 -0.5454
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.19
LMtest 0.48 0.70 0.22 0.44 0.44 0.36
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (3) estimated via
OLS:
∆illiqt =α+ β∆Xt + σvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt,
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repos amount outstanding in the US and UK respectively,
∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK respectively, excret
are the financial firms’ excess returns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign
countries and the US. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control variable for
uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the
coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of first-order serial correlation in the
residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December
2012, except for the ∆ratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001.
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Table 4: Cost and maturity of repos and the liquidity effect of funding constraints
1 2 3
dummy+rates ∗ ∆reposUS -0.6746
-1.8251
dummy−rates ∗ ∆reposUS -0.3939
-1.8345
dummy+rates ∗ ∆reposUK -0.3747
-3.3719
dummy−rates ∗ ∆reposUK -0.2898
-1.5607
dummy−mat ∗ ∆reposUS -0.5643
-2.2971
dummy+mat ∗ ∆reposUS -0.3334
-1.3649
vol 0.2967 0.2859 0.2850
2.2501 2.1315 2.1921
∆illiqt−1 -0.3561 -0.3704 -0.3562
-3.4204 -3.4898 -3.4081
constant -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0022
-0.3776 -0.4718 -0.1592
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.19
LMtest 0.49 0.74 0.50
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (4) estimated via
OLS:
∆illiqt =α+ β
+(dummy+ ∗ ∆Xt) + β−(dummy− ∗ ∆Xt) + σvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ]. ∆repos
US and ∆reposUK are the first difference of the
amount outstanding of repos in the US and UK. dummy+ and dummy− are dummies for increases
and decreases in repo rates or maturities. For rates, dummy+ and dummy− take the value of
1 when the rates increase and decrease respectively, and 0 otherwise. They are calculated for
the US and UK and interacted with their repo amount outstanding respective measure. For the
maturity, dummy− and dummy+ take the value of 1 for shortening and lengthening respectively of
the maturities of the repos in the US market, and 0 otherwise. We include the global FX implied
volatility, vol, as a control variable for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via
Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the
null of first-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample
period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the US repo rate interaction for which
the sample period starts in 2001.
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Table 5: The recent financial crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
dummycrisis ∗ ∆reposUS -0.7470
-2.8796
dummynocrisis ∗ ∆reposUS -0.4207
-1.9649
dummycrisis ∗ ∆reposUK -0.4600
-1.8208
dummynocrisis ∗ ∆reposUK -0.3080
-2.4271
dummycrisis ∗ ∆ratesUS -0.1394
-1.3469
dummynocrisis ∗ ∆ratesUS -0.0414
-1.3407
dummycrisis ∗ ∆ratesUK -0.0192
-0.6475
dummynocrisis ∗ ∆ratesUK 0.0514
0.3899
dummycrisis ∗ excret -0.8853
-2.1413
dummynocrisis ∗ excret 0.0545
0.5669
dummycrisis ∗ ∆flow -0.3459
-1.9834
dummynocrisis ∗ ∆flow -0.1567
-1.9270
vol 0.2960 0.3107 0.2913 0.2900 0.3107 0.3346
2.2329 2.3888 2.2854 2.2477 2.4049 2.7983
∆illiqt−1 -0.3591 -0.3677 -0.4501 -0.3845 -0.3970 -0.3891
-3.4259 -3.5398 -6.410 -3.5273 -3.5937 -3.5598
constant -0.0059 -0.0044 -0.0101 -0.0083 -0.0070 -0.0071
-0.4971 -0.3800 -0.9824 0.6835 -0.5877 -0.5821
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.18
LMtest 0.48 0.67 0.31 0.45 0.48 0.41
Notes: The table reports the results of the different specifications of regression (5) estimated via
OLS:
∆illiqt =α+ β(dummy
crisis
t ∗ ∆Xt) + γ(dummynocrisist ∗ ∆Xt) + δvolt + ϕ∆illiqt−1 + εt
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt]. ∆repos
US and
∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and
∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are financial firms’ excess re-
turns, ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US, and vol is
the global FX implied volatility. dummycrisis takes the value of 1 during the period from Lehman
Brothers collapse in September 2008 to July 2009, when the US recession ended, and 0 otherwise.
dummynocrisis takes the value of 0 for the crisis episode, and 1 otherwise. t-statistics are adjusted
via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values
for the null of first-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The
sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS for which the
sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 6: Panel analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vi 9.0072 0.0811 0.0663 0.0405 0.0625 0.0732 0.0796
4.8873 3.8611 3.1765 1.7266 2.9275 3.5267 3.8163
∆reposUS 0.2584
-2.2266
∆reposUK -0.2143
-3.3969
∆ratesUS -0.0389
-1.5370
∆ratesUK -0.0508
-1.4272
excret 0.0642
0.7827
∆flow -0.1049
-2.1195
Vi ∗ ∆reposUS -0.4805
-1.4359
Vi ∗ ∆reposUK 0.4318
2.5477
Vi ∗ ∆ratesUS 0.0101
0.1733
Vi ∗ ∆ratesUK -0.1510
-1.9408
Vi ∗ excret 0.1977
0.8887
Vi ∗ ∆flow -0.3057
-2.2987
illiqi,t−1 -0.4347 -0.4299 -0.4323 -0.4541 -0.4330 -0.4330 -0.4296
-27.7670 -27.4523 -27.7102 -26.2468 -27.6748 -27.6922 -27.4619
Rbar 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19
LMtest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ftest na 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table reports the results of the specifications of the panel regression (6) with fixed
effects:
∆illiqi,t =α+ β(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t) + ζXt + δVi,t + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt] and Vi are the series
of monthly standard deviation of daily currency returns. ∆reposUS and ∆reposUK are the log-
differenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the differ-
enced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the financial firms’ excess returns, and ∆flow are
the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US. t-statistics are reported under
the coefficients. Adjusted R2, LM test p-values for the null of first-order serial correlation in the
residuals, and results of the F-test for significance of the interaction term are reported in the last
three rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS
for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 7: Panel analysis and the financial crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vi 0.0818 0.0640 0.0406 0.0625 0.0733 0.0784
3.8029 3.0553 1.7294 2.9256 3.5310 3.7528
∆reposUS -0.2574
-2.2145
∆reposUK -0.2224
-3.5045
∆ratesUS -0.0388
-1.5329
∆ratesUK -0.0505
-1.4180
excret 0.0632
0.7684
∆flow -0.1047
-2.1171
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆reposUS -0.3596
-0.4002
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆reposUS -0.5015
-1.3759
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆reposUK 0.8655
2.1562
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆reposUK 0.3403
1.8289
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆ratesUS -0.1253
-0.9292
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆ratesUS 0.0356
0.5675
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆ratesUK -0.1420
-1.6595
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆ratesUK -0.1917
-1.0743
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ excret 0.011
0.0109
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ excret 0.2077
0.9081
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆flow -0.5181
-1.7074
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ ∆flow -0.2556
-1.7303
illiqi,t−1 -0.4299 -0.4320 -0.4542 -0.4330 -0.4330 -0.4296
-27.4486 -27.6896 -26.2535 -27.6698 -27.6877 -27.4567
Rbar 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19
LMTest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FTest 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table reports the results of the specifications of the panel regression (7) with fixed effects:
∆illiqi,t = α+ β(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummycrisist ) + γ(∆Xt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummynocrisist ) + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt
where ∆Xt = [∆repos
US
t ,∆repos
UK
t ,∆rates
US
t ,∆rates
UK
t , excrett,∆flowt] and Vi are the series of monthly
standard deviation of daily currency returns. dummycrisis takes the value of 1 during the recent financial
crisis from September 2008 to June 2009, and 0 otherwise; dummynocrisis takes the value of 0 during the
crisis, and 1 otherwise. ∆reposUS and ∆reposUK are the log-differenced repo amount outstanding in the
US and UK, ∆ratesUS and ∆ratesUK are the differenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are financial
firms’ excess returns, and ∆flow are the aggregated capital flows between foreign countries and the US.
t-statistics are reported under the coefficients. Adjusted R2, LM test p-values for the null of first-order serial
correlation in the residuals, and results of the F-test for significance of the interaction term are reported in
the last three rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ∆ratesUS
for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Figure 1: FX market illiquidity The FX market illiquidity is calculated as the cross-sectional
average of percentage bid-ask spreads across the 20 currencies in the sample against the USD. The
shaded area indicates the recent financial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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(a) US
(b) UK
Figure 2: Repo amount outstanding in the US and UK. The amount outstanding in the US
is in millions of USD and the amount outstanding in the UK is in millions of GBP. The shaded
area indicates the recent financial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 3: Aggregated capital flows The graph shows the aggregated flows of equity and bond
investments between the US and foreign countries. The flows are the sum of the inflows and outflows
aggregated across countries. The shaded area indicates the recent financial crisis from September
2008 to June 2009.
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